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Efficiency as Equity: Insights from
Comparative Law and Economics
By UGO MArEI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Equity and efficiency are usually perceived as antithetical con-
cepts. An efficient legal solution may not be equitable, and an equita-
ble one may not be efficient.' Many of the arguments used against
law and economics sound like this: law should be concerned with jus-
tice and equity; although such values may not be costless for a society,
even if their pursuit is inefficient, such costs are not something with
which lawyers should be concerned.
You can find this line of argument both in American and non-
American academic literature.2 However, now that law and econom-
ics is an established scholarly discipline, that sort of literature seems
rather banal and superficial. It fails to throw any new light on either
equity or efficiency as legal tools, and it does not tell us much that is
new about the nature of the legal process.3
* Alfred and Hanna Fromm Professor of International and Comparative Law, Has-
tings College of the Law, University of California. Professor of Law, University of Trento,
Italy. Dr.Giur. Universith di Torino (1983); LL.M. Boalt Hall (19S9).
Previous drafts of this paper were presented at the International Conference on Eq-
uity and Aequitas, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, May 1993; at the second Comparative
Law and Economics Forum Meeting, Brussels, June 1993; at the Faculty Work in Progress
meetings, Hastings College of the Law, October 1993; and at the American Law and Eco-
nomics Association, Author's Bazaar, Stanford Law School, May 1994. The author wishes
to thank the participants to these events for their valuable comments and, in particular,
Robert Cooter, James Gordley, Antonio Gambaro, Duncan Kennedy, Radhika Rao, Ru-
dolf Schlesinger, and Tony Weir, for their editing work and comments.
1. See e.g., A. MurcrmLL PoI~NSk.Y, AN INTRODUCION TO L w AND ECONOMICS
(2d ed. 1989).
2. See Ronald MA. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEAL S-'uD. 191 (1980); Mario J.
Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HorS'RA L Rv. 641 (1980); see also Christian Kirch-
ner, The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany, 11 INT'L REv. L & Eco.n.
277 (1991).
3. On the other hand, for a refreshing and deep analysis, see H. Pt-ro-N YoUo,
EQUITY IN THEORY AND PRAcnc (1994).
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In this paper I will adopt a comparative approach to law and eco-
nomics4 and discuss some of the contexts in which the notion of equity
has been used within the Western legal tradition. I will focus on the
relationship between equity and efficiency in these contexts in order
to show how equity and efficiency-far from being antithetical
ideas-are in reality much more closely linked than might at first
appear.
My paper is concerned with equity and efficiency in adjudication.
I will not, therefore, discuss the assumption, sometimes diffused in the
legal community, that equity has to do with distribution-and is there-
fore mainly the province of the legislature-while efficiency has to do
with the allocation of resources. I assume that both equity and effi-
ciency have a role in both these contexts.5
I will focus on three different contexts in which equity might
seem opposed to efficiency: (1) the institutional context, (2) the sub-
stantive context, and (3) the context of legal transplants. I will seek
historical and comparative evidence for my assumptions.
My conclusion is that equity and efficiency are of equal use to
lawyers as techniques of legal argument.
This paper is not normative. It is a first attempt to describe a
number of cases which may be explained or justified both in terms of
equity and in terms of efficiency.
H. EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE
INSTITUTIONAL ARENA
Equity is commonly used in an institutional sense. A common
lawyer immediately thinks of the Chancellor and his Court. In com-
parative law literature this is also the primary meaning of the term
equity. Indeed, one of the major classic differences between the com-
mon law and the civil law is the dual nature of Anglo-American juris-
prudence with its institution of trust and division between legal and
4. On this approach see Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in
Comparative Law and Economics, 14 IN'L R'v. L. & ECON. (1994). See also Ugo Mattel
& Roberto Pardolesi, Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries: A Comparative Ap-
proach, 11 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 265 (1991).
5. See, most recently, Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
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equitable rights and remedies, a result of the historical accident of eq-
uity jurisprudence.6
According to the classical work of Maitland,7 followed by leading
English legal historians from Holdsworth8 to Milsom9 to Baker,10 the
jurisdiction of the Chancellor in the sixteenth century developed to
overcome the shortcomings of the courts of common law. The formal-
ism of the writ system, and the fact that damages were the only rem-
edy at law, denied justice to plaintiffs in cases of continuing torts,
unfulfilled contracts, and breach of a relationship of trust. The plain-
tiff to whom justice was denied could go to the Chancellor to seek
equity-ie., justice given according to the Chancellor's conscience. It
was the Chancellor's business to examine the potential results of the
application of legal rules contained in the body of the common law
(e.g., rules on the transfer of ownership in the case of trusts) and to
stop the rigid enforcement of those rules by applying equity.
By the time of Lord Nottingham, equity had developed its own
set of doctrines administered in a separate set of courts. The Chancel-
lor's feet were harmonized." Remedies such as injunctions, specific
performance, tracing, and so forth were born.
This development is considered to be one of the major revolu-
tions in the history of the common law.
Supposedly, the moral idea of equity played such a large role in
this institutional adventure that it even gave its name to the entire
system. Chancellors were so interested in and concerned about equity
and justice that they created their own court.
We can now try to see the story from a different perspective. It is
an historical fact that English courts competed for patronage by work-
ing out more efficient institutional arrangements. The aim was to at-
tract clients by offering a cheaper, faster, and more effective justice.
We should never forget that the judges and practitioners of each court
were making their living from the success of the business of their
6. See RuDoLF B. SCHLESINGER ET Al.-, COMPARATivE LAw: CAsES, Tn-x-r, MATERX-
ALS (5th ed. 1988); RNEi DAvID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTF-MS IN THE
WORLD TODAY (3d ed. 1985).
7. FREDERC W. MArTLAND, EQUrrY (2d ed. 1936).
8. SIR WiuLjA6i HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGUSH L.w (1966).
9. S.F.C. MnsoM, HisTOmcAL FoUNDAMONS OF Thm Co.zoN LAw (1969).
10. JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCrION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (2d ed. 1979).
11. The great seventeenth century legal scholar, John Selden, in his Table Talk com-
pared the chancellor's conscience-which was the basis of equity jurisprudence-to the
length of the chancellor's foot. Each chancellor had a different conscience as well as a
different shoe size! JoHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 49 (Frederick Pollock ed., 1927).
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court. Moreover, running a superior court has always been a major
source of power since deciding cases entails the framing of legal
rules. 12
This competition explains, for example, the way in which the
King's Bench overtook the Common Pleas in the sixteenth century.
Common Pleas had been the leading common law court, but it was
slower to abandon old fashioned procedures. The King's Bench, by
using the bill procedure introduced in England by the equity court,
took the lead in the common law jurisdiction. 3 The famous battle for
jurisdiction at the time of Sir Edward Coke can also be explained by a
competitive model, where both common lawyers and equity lawyers
were as concerned with obtaining a monopoly position for their courts
as with achieving equity.1 4 Surely, the ultimate victory of equitable
remedies both in England (Judicature Acts) and in the United States
(Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) is primarily due to the more effi-
cient legal organization offered by the courts of equity.15
It is therefore interesting to note that the creation and survival of
such a set of remedies (injunctions, specific performance, trust, etc.)
can be justified both by equity (equity will not leave a plaintiff without
a proper remedy) and by efficiency. These remedies are, indeed, the
outcome of a competition between alternative legal instruments, de-
termined in the long run by considerations of institutional efficiency. 16
Law and economics gives us, in the theory of externalities, the
explanation of why injunctive relief (a property rule) is in many in-
stances more efficient than damages (a liability rule), and why the
judge should always be free to choose between them.' 7 Moreover,
one hardly needs law and economics to understand that a simpler sys-
tem of procedure and trial allows a decision to be made more cheaply
and therefore avoids waste.
12. See generally JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968).
13. See BAKER, supra note 10, at 87-88.
14. Compare R.C. VAN CANEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND I'ROFESSORS: CHAP-
TERS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY (1987). A similar pattern can be detected in the de-
feat of Admiralty Jurisdiction. Its "efficient" arsenal of legal tools was imported into
common law. See S. Lowry, Lord Mansfield and the Law Merchant: Law and Economics in
the Eighteenth Century, 7 J. EcoN. IssuEs 605 (1973).
15. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909 (1987).
16. That a modern legal system cannot survive without an effective remedy for contin-
uing torts or for breach of contracts is evidenced by the fact that sirdlar legal tools, in-
cluded in codes or developed in case law, are also available to litigants in the civil law.
17. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMIcs (1986).
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HI. EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, THE FORMS OF ACTION
AND THE WELFARE STATE
Equity introduced flexibility to the legal system. It is sufficient to
compare two authoritative books such as Littleton (1402-81) on Ten-
ures and Blackstone's (1723-80) Commentaries to get historical evi-
dence for such a conclusion. The former was written just before the
Chancellor's Court appeared on the scene. It describes a very strict,
rigid and completely unprincipled system of forms of action, shaped
by historical accidents. In contrast, Blackstone's book describes a
flexible system of decentralized decision-making developed by the
courts of law and equity. It describes the cooperative arrangement
developed after the Chancellorships of such great figures as Francis
Bacon, Lord Nottingham, and Lord Eldon. It is interesting that while
Littleton gives us a picture of the common law before the rise of eq-
uity, Blackstone provides us with one of the common law-or rather
the common law plus equity-before the rise of statute law.Is
Certainly, equity introduced an important element of flexibility
into the English legal system which was indispensable to its evolution
given the extreme rigidity of the writ system.1 9
Today, when all the western world lives in the age of statutes,."
the legal system is at least as complex and disharmonious as that de-
scribed by Littleton. Rigidity, however, is no longer due to a writ sys-
tem, but to the overuse of command and control regulation which
forecloses any principled development of the legal system. The clear-
est example in private law is in the law of torts: whenever a strict ex
ante regulation has been established, the possibility of an ex post test
of reasonableness of the conduct of an actor is simply withdrawn from
the judge. That withdrawal may be very inefficient, as some areas are
overregulated and others underregulated.2 ' In public law the analogy
between the forms of action and the modem machinery of justice is
even clearer. Even in England, where the bureaucratic reasoning of
public law has never reached the peaks that it has in other European
countries, recent developments illustrate my point. Under Order 53
of the Rules of the Supreme Court, a system has been established by
which the applicant for judicial review is trapped in the path he has
18. Cf. WtiuA . HOLDSWORTH, Sosm MAKERS OF ENGusH LA.w SS (1933).
19. For a comparative analysis see SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 299.
20. See Gumo CALABREsi, A CoswoN LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (192).
21. See W. PAGE KEETON ET Al., PROSSER AND KE TON ON THE Lw OF TORTS § 35
(5th ed. 1984).
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chosen. There is no way of turning to ordinary procedure once the
public law path has been chosen.22
There are many differences of course, but we can learn from his-
torical experience and say that complex regulation in the welfare state
plays a role similar to that played by the forms of action in medieval
common law-to foreclose the harmonious development of the law.
In this scenario, if a legal system is to evolve it needs the inter-
vention of some external force playing a role similar to that played by
the courts of equity in medieval England. Modem law and economics
is certainly trying to play this role by using the idea of efficiency rather
than that of equity.' The consequences in a concrete case of applying
positive law (e.g., a strict liability regulation) are discussed in the light
of the efficiency principle. The rigid and abstract application of regu-
lation or of doctrines of law is discouraged as inefficient.2 4 Law and
economics considers decentralized decision-making made by courts to
be better than centralized regulation. Decentralized decision-making
is better able to introduce flexibility.25
Efficiency considerations argue against any automatic application
of a given doctrine. In the American law of nuisance, for example, the
traditional common law-equity arrangement has been dismantled by
such considerations.
For example, in the New York case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co.,26 a polluting cement plant which employed over three hundred
workers was allowed to continue its activity but was compelled to
compensate for the continuing nuisance. The equitable doctrine that
any "unreasonable" nuisance must be enjoined was abandoned even
though damages were clearly insufficient for the plaintiffs. According
to the traditional maxim that equity does not leave a plaintiff without
an adequate remedy, an insufficient remedy at law should lead to an
injunction when, after balancing the equities, the nuisance is consid-
ered unreasonable. In this case, the traditional common law-equity
arrangement would have offered only a black or white alternative be-
22. See OWEN HOOD PHILLIPS & PAUL JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRA-
TrVE LAW (7th ed. 1987).
23. Compare, interestingly, Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a
Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989).
24. See, however, for some nuances, Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property
Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577 (1988); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standaxrds: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DuE L. 557 (1992).
25. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
26. Boomer v. At. Cement Co., 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870
(1970).
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tween enjoining the plant, if the nuisance was unreasonable, or al-
lowing the pollution to continue, if the nuisance was not
unreasonable. In a broader perspective, however, the internalization
of the externalities (damage remedy) was preferred on efficiency
grounds and the "balancing of hardships" shifted from the test of rea-
sonableness to the choice of the remedy.
In Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co.," an Arizona
"coming to the nuisance" case in which a residential area was built
close to a pre-existing pig-breeding farm, the solution whereby dam-
ages and injunction supplement each other to the exclusive benefit of
one party was also rejected. The doctrine that the remedy for a con-
tinuing tort was damages for the past plus an injunction for the future
was abandoned. The plaintiffs, who lived in the residential area, were
granted an injunction but the defendant farmer, who had to remove
his activity, was awarded compensation. In both these pathbreaking
cases, considerations of efficiency were explicitly taken into account
by the courts. 5
In different historical contexts and in different institutional back-
grounds, equity and efficiency have made similar contributions to the
development of the law. In the case of equity, a different set of law-
yers with a different set of doctrines introduced flexibility2 9 In the
case of efficiency, academic lawyers-different players in the legal
process-have introduced flexibility. We can also say that the pressure
for flexibility comes from a group of lawyers with a legal culture dif-
ferent from that shared by the participants of the legal process under
challenge. In the case of equity lawyers, the legal culture on which
they drew was the Roman law while lawyers advocating efficiency
drew on economics, both disciplines with high academic standing and
prestige.
IV. EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND SUBSTANTIVE
LEGAL RULES
Equity as an institution is a phenomenon peculiar to the common
law tradition. However, equity as a way of reasoning about law is not
27. Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 103 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
28. See COOTR & UL N, supra note 17, at 171-80.
29. Common lawyers took over the Courts of Equity after their secularization during
the reign of Henry VIII (1509-47).
1994]
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limited to the common law and is a characteristic of the Western legal
tradition.3
Efficiency as a paradigm of legal scholarship with a strong impact
on the legal process is a peculiarity of the American sy:stem. But effi-
ciency as a way of reasoning about law is no longer limited to the
common law world and is diffused among civil law countries as well.3 1
In certain cases, even the concrete solutions of certain legal
problems belong both to equity and efficiency. The law of takings-or
of expropriation in the public interest as it is known in the civil law-
provides us with an example of a convergence that is by no means
limited to a small number of legal systems. It exhibits a general trend
in the law which may help comparativists in their task "to discover the
forces that are permanently and universally at work in all systems of
law." 3
2
One of these forces is, to be sure, the principle of moral equity
according to which no single person should bear the complete burden
of a course of action whose benefits are common to a large number of
people. The person whose property is taken for public use suffers a
loss. This loss should be minimized as much as possible by paying
compensation which makes it possible, at least in theory, to buy simi-
lar property elsewhere. That this compensation should be paid by the
community which will benefit from the taking accord:; with the old
Justinian maxim of justice suum cuique tribuere. And indeed, the
guarantee of private property against the state, theoretically described
by the natural law and embodied in the revolutionary ]Declaration of
Human Rights, has been one of the cornerstones of modern political
and legal doctrine. From France the idea of the guarantee of private
property against the state has found its way into the legal systems of
the capitalistic world.33 Its content has been clear enough to lay the
foundations of a law which can be described as "common" (necessity
30. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983); PETER STEIN & JOHN SHAND, LEGAL VALUES IN
WESTERN SocIEy (1974).
31. See R. Cooter & J. Gordley, Economic Analysis in Civil Lay., Countries: Past,
Present, Future, 11 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 262 (1991).
32. Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313
(1978).
33. Among the founding fathers Madison was particularly influenced by French polit-
ical thought. Until "his" fifth amendment, private property had not been classed among
the fundamental values of American law. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORI.
GINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLTION 34-93, 188-89 (1967). Blackstone's scholarship was
based on the same natural law literature which was the cultural asset of the French Revolu-
tion. See S.F.C. Milsom, The Nature of Blackstone's Achievement, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL
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of public use; compensation). It has been flexible enough to allow
historical divergence particularly as to the amount of compensation,
although the trend is toward market value.
We should add that the institutional structure of the legal systems
which have reached the same result could not be more different. In
Germany and Italy, there are special Constitutional Courts.34 In the
United States, any judge may strike down an act or decision as uncon-
stitutional.3 In the United Kingdom, there is not even a written con-
stitution to apply.36 In France, the Constitutional Council reviews a
statute before its enactment but has no power of ex post judicial re-
view.3 7 Despite these huge institutional differences, the law of takings
may be considered largely convergent in these systems so far as the
underlying principles are concerned. 8
This convergence may be explained both as a matter of equity
and of efficiency. If we examine the problem of takings, there can be
no serious doubts that there are strong economic reasons to compen-
sate at market value private property taken for public use. As far as
the public use requirement is concerned, the economic theory of pub-
lic goods provides both a justification and a limit.3 9 The justification is
that the government needs to be able to acquire the inputs that are
necessary to provide public goods which the market cannot easily pro-
vide. The limit is set by the consideration that any private use of the
power of eminent domain will be inefficient since it produces a result
that private parties would not reach by bargaining. The forced sale, in
other words, would move the property from a higher valued use to a
lower valued use.
STUD. 1 (1981). Like all post World War II constitutions of defeated countries, the Ger-
man Basic Law is very much influenced by the U.S.Constitution.
34. GRuNDGEsErZ [Constitution][GG] art 93 (F.R.G.); see ARTHUR T. VoN ME ,REN
& J~ms P. GotrLEY, TrE Crvu LAw Ssm.i: AN IrroDucno Tore THE CooPAR.
TrW STUDY oF LAW 137 (2d ed. 1977); CoNsTrzo:nE [Constitution][Cost.] art. 134 (It-
aly); see M. CAPPELLETTI Er AL., THE ITALIAN LEoA. Sys 1i: AN INr"1ODUCTION
(1967).
35. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
36. ALBEr V. DicE , INTRoDucroN To THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE Co-.smrru.
TION 85-86 (8th ed. 1915).
37. See James E. Beardsley, The Constitutional Council and Constitutional Liberties in
France, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 431 (1972).
38. For an updated, systematically developed outline of the law of compensation for
expropriation, see COMPENSATION FOR E.TRopR OAom: A CoMiPARATIE STUDY (Gar-
vin M. Erasmus ed., 1990).
39. See, for a discussion, CoomER & ULEN, supra note 17, at 191.
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Compensation should be paid for takings in order to avoid exter-
nalities. It is inefficient to compel a private property ovner to assume
the entire cost of benefits that are enjoyed by the whole community.
The whole community should pay for the benefit it receives. Also,
efficiency requires us to spread losses as much as possible. Moreover,
the costs of governmental action should be internalized. In a public
use of eminent domain, however, it is inefficient to allow the private
property owner to force the government to pay the reservation price
for his property (i.e., the subjective value which he could insist on ob-
taining from a private person) because this would make the govern-
mental supply of public goods impossible. Every owner whose
property was involved would overestimate the value of the property
and would have an incentive to be the last person to settle.4 o The
efficient outcome is therefore guaranteed by paying the objective mar-
ket value.
This short analysis suggests that the general convergence of mod-
em legal systems, despite the large variety of institutional back-
grounds, could be explained both as a movement towards efficiency
and towards equity.
In many other instances, which can be illustrated from the law of
tort and contract, we can reach the same result. Among the topics
that have been recently discussed by scholars comparing equity and
aequitas41 much attention has been devoted to the duty to bargain in
good faith. And indeed, such a duty, which requires that a reasonable
amount of information be disclosed to the other party, is not only a
common development of modern contract law throughout the western
world, but is also commended by the very basic microcconomic as-
sumption that a certain amount of information must be disclosed to
the participants in a market or the market will not function properly.
Even more generally, the theory of "abuse of rights," although diffi-
cult to reconcile with the individualistic assumptions of a system of
private rights, has been accepted as a matter of equity throughout the
western world. Indeed such a doctrine is strongly supported by the
Pareto efficiency principle as well, and it is probably at the core of
Amartya Sen's criticisms of paretian efficiency.4'
40. Id. at 193.
41. See Second Hebrew University Conference on Equity (A.M. Rabello ed.,
forthcoming).
42. Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. PoL. ECON. 152 (1970).
See also CHARLES Row.EY & ALAN PEACOCK, WELFARE ECONOMICS: A LnEIAL RE.
SrATMENT (1975).
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It may be added that many of the contributions of law and eco-
nomics are by no means counter-intuitive. When efficiency advocates
take a normative approach, they advocate solutions often reached by
lawyers on traditional grounds. On the other hand, if we take the pos-
itive perspective, we have seen in the example of the competition be-
tween the courts that a certain legal evolution can be explained
equally by notions of equity and efficiency.
V. EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY AS LEGAL
ARGUMENTS
Law has an important practical dimension. Since the beginning
of the Western legal tradition lawyers have been arguing whether law
should be more of a theoretical doctrinal enterprise or just a practical
business. We can trace this debate to the reaction of the humanists to
the bartolists in the fifteenth century. Indeed, the role of lawyers in
the western world can be understood in terms of the continuous inter-
play of these two different approaches. The commitment to doctrine
and theory has been the major source of lawyers' legitimacy: they
were able to claim they had a neutral approach to problem solving.
The practical aspect of lawyers' work has made them a powerful and
influential corporation of hidden law-givers.4 3
Since law has a practical dimension it requires an approach some-
what different from that of a purely academic discipline. Participants
in the market of legal ideas, doctrines, and institutions are not only
scholars but also practicing lawyers, legislators, and even business
people. In the Popperian marketplace, on the other hand, participants
in the "game science" are only scholars.4" Legal scholars acknowledge
that the practical nature of their discipline is developing "normative"
theories alongside "positive" ones. In comparison, it would make no
sense for a linguist to develop a normative theory of, say, mute
consonants. 45
In order to maintain their role in framing legal rules and institu-
tions, lawyers had to find some reason why their opinions about the
43. For a discussion, see CARLO A. CANNATA & ANTONIO GAMuARo, L ,EA .m.nI
Di STORIA DELLA GIURISPRUDENZA EUROPA (4th ed. 1989).
44. KARL R. POPPER, Tim Loom OF Scmimnc Discovr.Y (1972).
45. See, on the task of linguistics, FERnnAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GE,'cNAL
LINGISTICS 6 (Charles Bally et al. eds. & Wade Baskin trans., 1966). On the analogies
between legal scholarship and linguistic scholarship, Rodolfo Sacco has developed a struc-
turalist approach. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approad to Comparative
Law, 39 AM. 3. CoMap. L. 1, 343 (1991) [Hereinafter Legal Formants].
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rules that govern society should count more than anybody else's.
They had to legitimize their work. For nine hundred years, whenever
they could not or would not rely on a "text," they played with the
philosophical concept of equity and justice. In using this concept,
however, they were not worried by or even aware of the many differ-
ent theoretical notions of equity and justice framed by legal philoso-
phers. Indeed legal philosophers and scholars of jurisprudence were
part of a transnational community of scholars, mostly civilians, whose
work was completely removed from the concrete workings of any pos-
itive legal system. This explains why the concepts used in the works
on jurisprudence have a foreign flavor for the common lawyers.a6
An impressive literature on the concept of equity or justice can
be found in any law library.47 A superficial look at it confirms the
incredible variety of significate coming out of the same significant (i.e.,
the word "equity"). Despite this, lawyers have been working with the
idea of aequitas since their profession began, and they have built up a
number of legal traditions around this ambiguous term. The same de-
velopment occurred, as we know, with English equity where the con-
science of the Chancellors became so harmonized with the rules of
common law that even equity courts developed a doctrine of stare
decisis. In other words, there have always been philosophical ideas of
equity and legal uses of the idea of equity.
If equity is traditionally a category of legal argument, the same
cannot be said for efficiency which has been marketed only recently as
an American product.
Seen in terms of the history of ideas, Law and Economics has
grown to be a powerful approach because the discipline has given
some strength to the claim that legal scholarship is a science.4 8 In-
deed, the shift from equity to efficiency brings to the analysis of the
law a set of value judgments which is claimed to be more widely ac-
ceptable and less subjective in nature.49 There may be as many opin-
46. According to Peter Stein, for example, jurisprudence always had a foreign flavor to
the common lawyer because of the deep debt it owed to Germany. See Peter Stein, Legal
Science During the Last Century: England, in INCHiEsTE Di DInrrro COMPARATO, LA
SCmZA DEL DIRmro NELL'ULTIMO SECOLO 19, 23-24 (Mario Rotondi ed., 1976).
47. It would be naive to attempt a bibliography here. See, however, just to get the
flavor, EDGAR BODENHEIMER, TREATISE ON JUSTICE (1967); Chaim Perelman, THE IDEA
OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUmENT (John Petrie trans., 1963).
48. See generally Guido Calabresi, The New Economic Analysis of'Law: Scholarship,
Sophistry or Self Indulgence, 68 PRoc. Bmr. AcAD. 85 (1982).
49. See Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic
Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 817 (1989) [Hereinafter Best Right Laws].
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ions on equity and justice as individuals evaluating a certain legal
solution or a certain factual situation (Selden's joke about the Chan-
cellor's feet tells us exactly this story). There are just three recognized
standards of economic efficiency which are at the roots of the success
of economics among the social sciences.50
However, as soon as efficiency ceases to be merely an economic
notion defined by academics and enters the argument of lawyers, the
lawyers continually shift from one meaning to another as their practi-
cal arguments require. Thus, once efficiency enters the practical arena
of the law, it necessarily loses some of its claimed scientific rigor and
objectivity.5' Even law and economics scholars are divided on such
crucial issues as whether in car accident cases a strict liability regime is
more or less efficient than a fault regime. And again, there are effi-
ciency arguments on both sides of the question as to whether the sea-
shore should be maintained in a regime of public or private property,
or whether regulatory takings should or should not be compensated.
Europeans experienced a practical awakening from the wonderlands
of legal objectivity when, while enacting the American-inspired direc-
tive on products liability, they consulted American law and economics
literature to decide whether producers should be liable for the so-
called development risks. They discovered that it was impossible to
find a single answer to this important question.52
In response to such a scenario, we may say that both equity and
efficiency are only techniques of legal argument. They are therefore
typical scholarly products that are indeed very influential in the suc-
cess of a legal theory in the marketplace of legal doctrines, but are
empty boxes which need to be filled with meaning by the legal
community.5 3
50. Pareto Efficiency, Kaldor Hicks Efficiency, and Wealth Maximization. For a dis-
cussion of the three, see 2 RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONO.uc ANALvsLs OF LAW (3d ed.
1986). See also Symposium, Efficiency as Legal Concern, 8 HoFrSA L REv. 485 (1980).
Just as the ordinalist revolution has succeeded in making economics "scientific" by solving
the problems related to interpersonal comparisons, the law and economics revolution
claims to have succeeded in doing the same to legal scholarship after the abrupt awakening
lawyers were given by legal realism.
51. Compare Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further,
100 YALE LJ. 1211 (1991) with Best Right Laws, supra note 49.
52. See Giulio Ponzanelli, The European Community Directive on Products Liability,
in TORT LAw AND TmE Putnuc IwrERasr 238 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
53. For an interesting discussion of the need of efficiency to be fulfilled by value
choices, see DuNCAN KEm y, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Cri-
tique, 33 STAN. L. Rv. 387 (1981).
1994]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
VI. EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS
If equity and efficiency are just scholarly techniques there is no
doubt that their role in the legal process can better be understood
within the theory of legal transplants.54 From this point of view, we
can say that English equity is the product of a transplantation of doc-
trines from the Roman law to the peculiar institutional conditions of
England. In competing for patronage by offering more efficient legal
tools to litigants, the early Chancellors, at the time clergymen, were
using the legal skills provided by their canonistic background. As is
well known, canon law and civil law continually interacted with each
other. The most notable importation in this early period was the so-
called Roman canonical procedure; but many substantive doctrines
were imported as well, particularly in the domain of contract law.
Early Chancellors were clearly at ease in using the reorganized Ro-
man law doctrines.55 Once the Courts of Equity had been secularized,
and common lawyers had taken over the office of Chancellor, this rich
heritage of flexible doctrines would have been wasted had it not been
translated into a language familiar to common lawyers by St.
Germain's Doctor and Student.56 From that moment the same ideas
of equity developed in very different ways in England and on the con-
tinent. In England they developed into modem equity jurisprudence.
On the continent, in a reaction against a prior period that had at-
tempted to make the law excessively precise, general clauses were
codified (good faith is the best known example) in order to provide
the flexibility needed by any modem legal system.5 7 A:Eter this impor-
tation from the civil law to the common law, the direction changed.58
54. Such a theory is sustained in its extreme form by ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANS-
PLANTS: AN APPROACH TO CoMPARATIVE LAW (1978). For its use in comparative law
and economics, see Mattei, supra note 4.
55. See JAVIER MARTINEz-TORRON, DERECHO ANGLOAMERICANO Y DERECHO CA-
NONICO (1991).
56. See Holdsworth, supra note 18, at 266.
57. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 299. "Modem civil law, i.e. Code Law, is essen-
tially the product of the last two centuries, a period sufficiently free from ancient formalism
so that the draftsmen of the codes have been able to combine both stnct rules of law and
broad equitable principles in a single unified structure." Id.
58. According to RuDoLto SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DlRrrro COMPARATO (4th ed.
1988), two reasons have determined the increase of "prestige" of Anglo-American law in
the world legal community after World War II: first, the feeling that the system was more
efficient and therefore progress and development would follow from its adoption; and sec-
ond, the feeling that individual rights have been more effectively protected in common law
than in civil law countries.
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The more interesting institutional tools created by courts of equity
were reimported by the civil law. Trust is of course the best example.
We can again draw a parallel between equity and efficiency.
However, we should first make clear that scholarly writings may be
agents of legal change as powerful as the concrete remedies offered by
a court of law. In the competition for framing the rules of law, legal
doctrine is a powerful contender5 9 In the long run the impact of
scholarly teaching and reasoning heavily influences applied law. This
is particularly true in contexts in which the courts are not organized as
a centralized power. It is no surprise that the role of legal scholars has
been much greater in Germany than in France. Indeed, in Germany
judicial power has never been centralized in a single pyramid.60 It was
not centralized in the nineteenth century since unity came late (1870)
and scholars had already gained their predominant position. It was
not even centralized after political unity, because each area of the law
had its own pyramid, and border conflicts in the penumbra allow
greater scope for scholarly work. The same relationship may be found
in the common law world, by comparing England and the United
States. In England, where there is a strong centralized judiciary, the
position of legal scholars has always been depressed. In the United
States, since Langdell, legal scholarship has been the most important
force promoting national uniformity of the legal system.61 The West-
em legal tradition is so full of instances in which legal change is led by
scholars that we do not need to give examples here. Scholars often
push for legal change by advocating foreign solutions openly or
secretly. Scholars thus become powerful agents of legal
transplantation.62
In the United States, law and economics is already deeply influ-
encing the methods of reasoning of a new generation of lawyers, and
its impact on the applied law is already a reality.63 In the civil law,
moreover, analysis in terms of efficiency is not only an imported aca-
59. Compare, for a demonstration of this assumption, Legal Formants, supra note 45,
at 346.
60. See Francis Dedk & Max Rheinstein, The Development of French and German
Law, 24 GEo. L.. 551 (1936).
61. For a full discussion see UGo MATrEi, CONMON LAw: IL Dmrro ANGLOAMERI-
cA o 262.
62. See P.G. Monateri, Legal Doctrine as a Source of Law: A Transnational Factor and
a Historical Paradox, in ITALAN NATIONAL REPORTS, XI CONGRESS OF THE IN'TERNA-
noNAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIvE LAw (Sydney, 1986).
63. See generally Symposium, Economists on the Bend, 50 LAw & Cow'¢rEsi'. PROnS.
1 (1987).
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demic movement. Its institutional impact may reach applied law on
all the occasions-which are more and more frequent-in which an
American solution is imported. Products liability-imported from the
United States into Germany and then incorporated in the European
directive-is a good example.64
Continental lawyers have managed to cast themselves as political
problem-solvers by developing connections with the intellectual and
cultural leadership of their society. Legal paradigms have always been
successful in direct proportion to their degree of correspondence with
leading scientific paradigms. Much historical evidence may be offered
for this hypothesis.6
Philological techniques used in medieval religious and literary
culture were also applied by the glossators. Humanistic ideas at the
beginning of the modem age supported the legal revolution of the
humanists, from Cuiacius to Alciatus. And the link between philo-
sophical rationalism and natural law is again as easy to observe as the
Kantian roots of the historical school founded by Savigny. These ap-
proaches to the law have penetrated the entire Western legal tradition
and were not limited to the civil law world. It is sufficient to allude to
the work of Bracton, to that of Grotius, as well as to the magnificent
success of Savigny and his school from England to the United States. 66
At a certain moment, the common lawyers, who like the classical
Roman jurists had lived somewhat apart from the cuitural environ-
ment of their society, became active in the universities as "scientists."
Meanwhile the civilians, abandoning their universalist attitude, have
enclosed themselves in state-based parochialism. The result has been
a major change of leadership within the Western legal tradition: com-
mon law models-hitherto tributary to the Romanist tradition-have
taken the lead.67
The success of the idea of efficiency as an analytic tool for legal
analysis may be understood within this framework. Economics is still
64. The directive followed the American model as it was being promoted by a German
scholar while, as it is well known, the German Supreme Court had simply (and effectively)
reversed the burden of proof. See SCHLESrNGER, supra note 6, at 560-61.
65. See CANATA & GAMBARO, supra note 43.
66. See generally Symposium, Savigny in Modem Comparative Per.;pective, 37 Am. J.
Comp. L. 1 (1989).
67. For evidence of this development see Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intel-
lectual Leadership in Western Law, 42 AM. J. Comp. L. 195 (1994).
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considered the queen of the social sciences.6 American legal models,
which already enjoy worldwide prestige, receive a strong scientific le-
gitimation from their connection with economic science. When phi-
losophy was the prestigious academic discipline, lawyers managed to
find within its tools-or more precisely within its jargon-the key to
their success. The pattern is now repeating with economics. Western
lawyers are constantly seeking some trapping of nobility, to cope with
the social responsibility.69
68. See Robert D. Cooter, Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to
the Economic Analysis of Law and a Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L Rev. 1260
(1980).
69. See, for a powerful illustration, Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of
Legal Evolution, 90 YALE LJ. 1238 (1981). See also the comments, mostly focused on the
economic argument, by Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90
YALE LJ. 1275 (1981).

